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-2 -year investment horizons. Furthermore, their investment decisions may be excessively influenced by the recent trailing returns of different asset classes.
The behavior of professional investment managers is better informed and more disciplined than that of ordinary humans. Recent financial history reminds us of a third lesson, however. The decisions of professional managers are also subject to serious error, including many kinds of error identical to those committed by ordinary humans. When investment professionals manage assets owned by other, less sophisticated investors, their behavior is naturally affected by self interest. If investment professionals have an outsize influence in determining their own compensation contracts, the contracts will frequently reward investment behavior that is not in the best interest of investors. Of course, far-sighted and well-informed investors will reject such contracts and seek out managers offering compensation terms that closely align the interests of managers and investors. Unfortunately, far-sighted, well-informed investors are greatly outnumbered by ordinary humans (see lesson #2 above). Ordinary humans typically place their savings in the hands of investment managers who receive compensation under performance contracts that reward them for short-term performance but fail to penalize them when short-term gains are later reversed by large-scale losses. The asymmetry of this reward structure is advantageous for investment managers but not in the interests of people whose funds are invested.
These lessons of the financial crisis have direct implications for the role and regulation of private, worker-controlled retirement investment accounts in a nation's pension system. Such pensions have important advantages, as has been noted by advocates of social security privatization. The buildup of funds in individual retirement accounts can boost private and national saving. For most workers the relationship between contributions and ultimate retirement benefits is much more transparent in the case of individually owned investment accounts than it is in traditional public pension systems. The transparency and simplicity of the relationship between contributions and benefits may reduce the labor supply distortions induced by a pension system.
The financial crisis reminds us, however, that the pensions payable under a private investment account system are highly variable from one year to the next unless workers invest in a very conservative portfolio. Optimistic estimates of workers' expected returns under private retirement accounts almost always assume that workers hold a sizeable percentage of their -3 -portfolios in risky assets. If they make this investment choice their pensions will be very unpredictable even under optimistic assumptions about their self-discipline in maintaining a consistent and prudent investment strategy. Recent evidence suggests that many if not most worker-investors are far less well-informed and self-disciplined than assumed in the standard economic model, which implies that the risk-adjusted returns actually obtained by workers will fall short of the theoretical returns implied by standard financial theory. The assumption that fund managers acting as agents of the worker-investors will act solely in the interests of retirement savers is hard to reconcile with the actual behavior of fund managers (Bebchuk and Fried 2003 and Bebchuk 2009 ). This is another reason that unregulated or lightly regulated retirement investment accounts can produce risk-adjusted returns that are well below returns that are implied by financial market history.
In the remainder of the paper I briefly describe some of the recent debate over social security privatization and consider in detail the historical evidence on the variability of pensions financed out of individual investment accounts. This evidence is based on observed returns on major U.S. asset classes over the period from 1872 through 2008. In other papers I have considered the variability of returns in individual account pensions for worker-investors in other industrial countries (Burtless 2003 and 2007) . On the whole, the variability of hypothetical pensions is lower for workers in the United States than it is for workers in other industrialized countries. The policy implications of these results therefore also extend to most other industrial countries. I next consider evidence on the actual financial knowledge and investment behavior of retirement savers. The paper ends with a short discussion of policy implications for national pension design.
I. Background
The goals of a national pension system are to assure secure and adequate incomes to workers whose earnings have been reduced as a result of invalidity or old age and to assure adequate incomes to the surviving dependents of deceased workers. Economists emphasize that these goals should be achieved through programs that are affordable and that preserve incentives for able-bodied people to work throughout their careers. Some also stress that the programs should not interfere with the goal of maintaining adequate national saving. In recent years governments and international organizations have focused on designing or reforming national pension systems so they can be kept affordable in the long run.
-4 -For many rich and middle-income countries, population aging is a major stimulus for reform. The projected budget costs associated with population aging are so large that governments have been or will be forced to make major changes in the structure of their pension systems. In the past two decades policymakers in a number of rich countries have shown interest in following the example of Chile, which replaced its public, pay-as-you-go pension system with a private system organized around individual investment accounts. Advocates of this kind of reform point to Chile's success in introducing a private account system to replace a failing and under-funded public system, a system the government began phasing out in the early 1980s. In the past three decades, Chile's private pension system has received high marks for sound administration, good returns, and broad political acceptance. (It has, however, received lower marks because of major holes in workforce coverage.) The expected surge in public retirement costs in rich industrialized countries has made many economists and some policymakers receptive to the idea of a Chilean-style private substitute or supplement to existing unfunded public systems.
The World Bank spurred interest in this kind of reform in the early 1990s when it published Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994). The book advocated a three-pillar national pension system. The first proposed pillar would provide basic, defined-benefit (DB) pensions, funded out of current payroll or income taxes, and it would assure minimally adequate incomes to the covered population. This component of the system would be mandatory and publicly managed. A second mandatory but privately managed system would collect earningsrelated contributions from the covered workforce and deposit them in individual, definedcontribution (DC) pension accounts. The accounts would be publicly regulated but privately managed. Pensions financed out of the accounts would be fully funded, possibly contributing in the early years of reform to a higher national saving rate. The third pillar of the suggested system would provide workers with a structured vehicle for retirement savings in addition to the savings mandated by the first two pillars of the system. This component would be voluntary and privately managed. The first pillar of the system would be explicitly redistributive in favor of the poor and other disadvantaged groups, and the first two pillars of the system would provide critical lifecycle insurance to workers and their dependents. In many, though not all, rich countries adoption of the three-pillar system recommended by the World Bank would entail a substantial shift toward a more funded and more privately managed social security system. Joseph Stiglitz, argues against the idea that a privately managed, defined-contribution pension program is the most sensible way to organize the funded portion of a national pension system (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001) . A key point of their analysis is that many of the supposed advantages of private, defined-contribution pensions over public systems are based on unrealistic comparisons between an ideal, efficiently managed private system and existing public retirement programs. This kind of comparison sheds no light on the inherent advantages and disadvantages of the two kinds of system. If a private, defined-contribution system were actually implemented, it would fall short of the ideal envisioned by proponents. Similarly, the shortcomings of existing public, defined-benefit retirement programs are not necessarily inherent in such systems.
Instead, they might be the result of policy mistakes that can be easily remedied.
Proponents of defined-contribution pensions frequently argue, for example, that such pensions provide superior labor supply incentives, because they do not distort the marginal relationship between a worker's pension contributions, on the one hand, and expected pension benefits, on the other. This claim depends crucially on the returns workers expect to obtain on their pension contributions. In countries with imperfect capital markets, it is conceivable that workers assign very low probability to their chances of obtaining positive or even zero returns on their DC pension contributions. In extreme cases, their contributions may be viewed as equivalent to a pure tax on earnings. In most existing public, defined-benefit systems, there is a gap between workers' marginal contribution and the marginal gain they can expect in the form of higher future benefits. This gap is not inherent in DB plans, however, since benefit formulas can be reformed to strengthen the link between contributions and expected future pensions.
II. Variable returns and funded pensions
The financial crisis has reminded many workers of the uncertainty of returns on private savings. Workers whose retirement savings were mainly invested in corporate equities, real estate, or corporate bonds have sustained heavy losses over the past year. In most countries, stock market losses have exceeded 35 percent of the investor's holdings at the start of last year.
In some countries, losses in major asset classes have exceeded 50 percent. The effect of these kinds of losses on labor supply incentives is not always easy to assess. The wealth losses will -6 -almost certainly encourage later retirement among workers who had large DC wealth holdings when the crisis began. On the other hand, workers who are compelled to make minimum annual contributions into a DC plan may scale back their assessment of the future payoff from such contributions. It is hard to see how this reassessment of the value of mandated pension contributions has an effect that differs materially from the effect of increasing the tax on labor compensation. The efficiency differences between contributions to DB and DC pension accounts, whether publicly or privately managed, are easy to exaggerate.
The government can sponsor and manage either DB or DC plans, and both types of plan can be either funded or unfunded. Typically, of course, governments offer unfunded DB plans.
Similarly, private employers can offer their employees either DB or DC plans. In the United
States an important distinction between privately sponsored DB and DC plans is the identity of the party that bears the risk of asset market fluctuations. If an employer offers a DB plan, the employer must pay promised benefits to covered workers, regardless of the returns on the pension fund's portfolio. Employers bear the risk of financial market fluctuations. If an employer offers a DC plan, it is responsible for making promised contributions into each worker's retirement account but it bears none of the risk of financial market fluctuations. When investments held in a worker's account earn poor returns, the worker will accumulate a small nest egg and obtain a small pension.
Much of the public discussion of the U.S. financial crisis has focused on the misfortune of older workers enrolled in DC plans. This is understandable, both because their problems are obvious and because well over half of private-sector employees in the U.S. who are enrolled in a private pension plan are covered solely by a company-sponsored DC plan. Only 10% of enrolled private-sector workers are covered solely by a DB plan. In the recent past, however, companysponsored DB plans were much more important. In 1979, 62% of pension-covered privatesector workers were enrolled solely in a DB plan and another 22% were enrolled in both DB and DC plans. Even though private DB plans are now less important than they were in the past, they remain economically significant because they are offered by so many large, high-compensation employers.
The recent financial market turmoil has exposed the risks of company DB plans, both to employers and to employees. The future pension liabilities of such plans are funded under a variety of assumptions about average future returns in different asset classes, expected employee -7 -tenure under the plan, and the life expectancy of pensioners. When the trailing returns on plan assets are high, employers make small contributions or no contributions at all to their plans.
When trailing returns are low, many plans face a serious underfunding problem. Unfortunately, periods in which trailing returns are low tend to have two other characteristics: Nominal bond yields are also low, and company bankruptcy rates are high. When bond yields are low, the cost of purchasing annuities for newly retired workers is high. DB pension plans need more funds per worker to pay for anticipated future liabilities. Unfortunately, the level of assets in the fund has declined because recent returns on those assets have been low or negative. The combination of low asset valuations and high annuity prices makes the firm liable for higher pension contributions, often at a time when economy-wide demand for its products is low. Increased funding obligations for the DB plan may in fact help push the company into bankruptcy. Since 1974 the U.S. government has provided pension insurance to workers enrolled in companysponsored DB plans. The insurance has important limitations, however. Workers of bankrupt firms who are owed large pensions or who are younger than 65 may receive insurance coverage for only part of their promised pensions. As this discussion shows, the financial market risks of corporate DB plans are shared in a very complicated way by sponsoring companies, their employees, and the government. Since the division of risk is far from transparent, the impact of the financial crisis on DB pensions has received much less attention than the impact on workers who are enrolled in DC plans. It seems likely, however, that the crisis will contribute to a further erosion in the popularity of company DB pension plans.
It is worth reflecting on the reasons why one country -the United States -originally Many industrial and trade union pension plans became insolvent, leaving covered pensioners and older workers without a dependable source of old-age income. Given these shocks, it cannot be -8 -surprising that the president, Congress, and most voters thought a public pension plan, backed by the taxing power of the government, was preferable to sole reliance on private retirement savings. Plunging stock prices and falling home values sharply reduced the net wealth of U.S.
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households (see Figure 3) . The ratio of household net worth to household disposable income fell from 6.4 in the second quarter of 2007 to 4.7 in the first quarter of 2009. Although the current wealth-income ratio is not low by historical standards, the large losses in household wealth will have a profound effect on older workers and retirees who largely depend on private assets to support their retirement consumption. The sharp drop in wealth will make it difficult for older workers to afford retirement and for current retirees to maintain their previous consumption.
-10 -In contrast to the performance of most private assets, the inflation-adjusted value of social security benefits was essentially unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis. Social security pensions are not totally secure, of course. If the U.S. Congress does not raise the contribution rate or scale back social security benefits sometime in the next 30 years, the reserves of the system will be depleted by about 2040. At that point social security pensions will have to be cut or contributions increased. If all of the adjustment takes the form of a benefit reduction, which is the outcome mandated by current law, monthly pensions will have to be cut about 22%. The long-run funding problem of social security is one reason critics argue for full or partial privatization of the system. In 2005 President George W. Bush urged Congress to adopt a reform plan that would allow U.S. workers to divert some of their social security contributions into private retirement accounts. The reform would have undercut social security funding because workers who opted into the new accounts would send smaller contributions to the existing system. Since social security's revenue base would be smaller, Congress would -11 -eventually be forced to reduce monthly pensions or make large transfers from the U.S. Treasury to assure that the system will not become insolvent.
Individual account plans like the one proposed by President Bush differ from traditional social security in an obvious way. Each worker's private retirement benefit depends solely on the size of the worker's contributions and the success of the worker's investment strategy. Workers who make bigger contributions and earn better returns on their savings will receive larger pensions than workers who contribute less and earn lower returns. In contrast, workers' social security benefits depend on their average lifetime wages, their eligible dependents when they claim a pension, and the age at which a benefit is claimed. Workers who retire at the same age and with the same earnings records generally receive very similar benefits, regardless of the year in which they claim a pension or the current level of asset prices.
A claimed advantage of individual retirement accounts is that they permit workers to earn a much higher rate of return than can be obtained on contributions to a fully mature, pay-as-yougo public pension program. I have heard it claimed, for example, that workers can expect to earn negative rates of return on their contributions to social security, while they can earn 6% or more on their contributions to a private retirement account. The comparison is incorrect and seriously misleading. 1 Most U.S. workers can expect to obtain positive real returns on their contributions to social security. Over the next few decades, only a small fraction could obtain significantly higher returns if the U.S. public pension system were partly or fully privatized.
Market fluctuations and the value of pensions.
A basic problem with individual retirement accounts was highlighted by the recent market turmoil. It is hard to predict how much retirement income will be produced by a private savings plan or DC pension account. workers' careers until they reach their early or mid fifties, and then earnings begin to fall. When workers reach age 62, I assume they use their retirement savings to purchase a single-life annuity. A standard measure of the value of an annuity is the replacement rate, which is simply the amount of the monthly annuity expressed as a percentage of the worker's final wage.
2 2 I assume that the age profile of earnings in a given year matches the age profile of earnings for American men in 1995 as reported by the Census Bureau. In addition, I assume that average earnings in the economy as a whole grow 1.5% a year. While it would be interesting to see how workers' pensions would vary if we altered the percentage of contributions invested in exotic assets, in my calculations I assume that all contributions are invested in some combination of U.S. stocks, long-term U.S. government bonds, and low-risk, short-term commercial paper or 6-month certificates of deposit. The total return calculation for stocks is based on the return for the Standard and Poor's composite stock index; the total return calculation for bonds reflects the return on U.S. government debt with a maturity of at least ten years. For years up through 1997 the total return on safe 6-month securities is based on the yield on commercial paper published by the Federal Reserve; for years after 1997, when the Federal Reserve series was discontinued, the safe short-term total return is calculated from the yield on 6-month certificates of deposit. Interest and dividend payments from the worker's investment portfolio are immediately reinvested in the same security, and the worker's portfolio is rebalanced at the end of every year to achieve a planned percentage distribution of stock, bond, and safe short-term investments. I assume that workers incur no expenses buying, selling, or holding stocks, bonds, and safe short-term securities, which biases upward estimated rates of return. When workers reach their 62nd birthdays, they use their asset accumulations to purchase a single-life annuity for males. (Joint survivor annuities for a worker and a spouse would be about one-fifth lower than the ones shown in the charts.) To determine the annuity company's charge for the annuity, I use the Social Security Actuary's projected--14 - and 75%. The average replacement rate is 40%. For workers retiring after 1945, the replacement rate has averaged 49%.
The main lesson to be drawn from the chart is that individual retirement accounts invested solely in the stock market offer a very shaky foundation for a secure retirement income.
Workers with the good fortune to retire when stock prices are high obtain big pensions, while workers with the bad luck to retire after a market crash can be left with a very meager retirement income. The largest pension shown in the chart is more than seven times bigger than the smallest one. Even in the years since 1960, the experiences of retiring workers have differed dramatically.
The biggest pension was almost four times the size of the smallest one. In the six years from 1968 to 1974, the replacement rate fell fifty-one percentage points, plunging from 83% to 32%.
In the six years from 1993 to 1999, it jumped fifty-one percentage points, soaring from 38% to 89%. In the twelve months from December 2007 to December 2008, the predicted replacement rate dropped eighteen percentage points, falling from 45% to 23%, the smallest replacement rate in more than fifty years. life table for males reaching age 65 in 1995. The annuity company is assumed to invest solely in long-term U.S. government bonds, so when it determines the price of an annuity, it uses the current yield on long-term government bonds. I assume that the annuity company sells a fair annuity. It does not earn a profit, incur administrative or selling costs, or impose extra charges to protect itself against the risk of adverse selection in its customer pool. These assumptions are unrealistic. Annuity companies typically charge an amount that is between 10% and 15% of the selling price of annuities to cover these items. My assumptions therefore yield an overly optimistic estimate of the pension that each worker would receive. For a more detailed explanation of the calculations, see Burtless (2003) .
-15 - course, workers who opt for a low-risk investment strategy will also receive a lower replacement rate on average than they would obtain if they invested all their savings in equities. Whereas the average replacement rate under a 100% stock investment strategy is 40%, the average under the 50% stock / 50% bond strategy is only 24%. Under the 100% government bond strategy, the average is just 14%. Besides investing in very safe assets, there are a couple of other strategies DC-covered workers can follow to reduce the uncertainty of their retirement incomes. One strategy is to begin purchasing annuities before reaching retirement and to buy a sequence of annuities over a number of years. This reduces the risk that all of the worker's funds will be converted to annuities when asset prices are exceptionally low or annuity prices are exceptionally high. In an earlier paper, I looked at the success of this strategy in reducing the variability of workers' initial replacement rates (Burtless 2002) . Workers who purchased annuities in annual installments beginning five years before retirement were able to reduce the standard deviation of initial replacement rates by about one-sixth compared with workers who converted all of their savings at retirement. For workers who invest heavily in stocks before converting to an annuity, this -17 -strategy also reduces the expected return on lifetime savings, because assets are held as relatively safe, low-return annuities for a greater percentage of the worker's career.
Another investment strategy, popularized by financial advisors and mutual fund companies, is to shift gradually from a portfolio that is dominated by high-risk, high-return assets early in a career to a portfolio that is dominated by low-risk, low-return assets near the age of expected retirement (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997) . Judging by the portfolio descriptions provided by mutual fund companies, there is no agreement on how this portfolio shift should be accomplished. Figure 6 shows the portfolio allocation to equities (foreign and domestic) in six target-retirement-date funds, with the percent allocation plotted as a function of the number of years until a worker's expected retirement age. The average allocation in the six funds is indicated in the chart, as are the allocations in two funds with major differences in portfolio allocations. All the fund managers agree that equities should account for a declining percentage of worker assets as retirement approaches, but they do not agree on the starting and ending allocations or the rate at which equity investments should be exchanged for safe assets. 
100% bonds
Note: Replacement rates calculated at assumed retirement age (62) for 98 hypothetical workers retiring at the end of 1911-2008. The assumed contribution rate is 4% of each worker's annual salary.
Source: Author's calculations as explained in text.
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The mean and standard deviation of pension replacement rates under alternative investment strategies are displayed in Figure 8 . Not surprisingly, both the mean and the standard deviation are highest under an investment strategy that places 100% of the portfolio in U.S.
equities. The lowest expected replacement rate and standard deviation are obtained under an investment strategy that places 100% of assets in long government bonds. The reduced variability of pension outcomes is obtained at considerable cost, however. The average replacement rate under a 100% bond investment strategy is almost two-thirds lower than the mean replacement rate when all retirement savings are invested in stocks. The other two portfolios show considerably less variability in replacement rates than the all-stock investment strategy. The target-age portfolio recommended by Shiller yields only slightly more variability than the all-bond portfolio, yet the mean replacement rate is more than half again larger than the average replacement rate under the all-bond investment strategy. Thus, in comparison with the all-bond portfolio, the Shiller investment strategy has a major advantage.
It is interesting to compare the impacts of recent stock market downturns on replacement rates under the four investment strategies. Table 1 The uncertainty of private account pensions is understated in the replacement rate charts.
The calculations do not take account of the effects of inflation in the years after a worker retires.
In periods of high inflation, such as the 1940s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s, U.S. inflation was high and erratic. Social security benefits are adjusted upward to reflect changes in prices, sparing pensioners from the adverse effects of unexpected inflation. Workers with private pensions or annuities do not receive this kind of inflation protection. As a result, private pensioners experience big drops in the purchasing power of their annuities when prices rise unexpectedly.
Although a number of countries make inflation-protected annuities available to private investors, such annuities are still difficult or impossible to obtain in most countries, including the United
States.
-21 - 
III. Investor psychology
Investor psychology poses a second kind of risk that is not reflected in the charts. All the calculations are based on the assumption that workers follow a disciplined and consistent investment strategy throughout their careers. Research shows that many ordinary investors are neither consistent nor disciplined in their portfolio choices. They over-invest in assets that have performed strongly in the recent past, and they sell assets after a persistent or sharp fall in prices.
These tendencies mean that many ordinary investors are inclined to buy assets when their price is high and sell them after their price has declined. Workers who make this kind of investment mistake will earn lower returns than the returns shown in the charts. The risk that workers might choose a bad investment strategy does not arise in current social security programs. Public social security provides a minimally adequate pension for nearly all workers who make contributions over a full career, regardless of the worker's investment expertise.
A retirement system that relies on workers to make their own decisions about retirement saving and investment would work well if workers make these decisions competently. The policy is riskier when a large fraction of workers bases saving and investment decisions on incomplete or faulty information, short time horizons, and bad reasoning. Private DC pension plans may -22 -require workers to assume more responsibility to save for retirement and to plan the timing of asset withdrawal after they retire. Nearly all such retirement plans require workers to allocate their pension savings across different investment options. If a nation relies heavily on workerdirected and privately managed DC accounts, it should be confident that most workers will make good decisions. Serious planning errors, either when the worker is employed or after she retires, can lead to serious hardship if the worker's error is a big one. By the time a retired worker discovers she has saved too little or has invested unwisely, she may have little opportunity to undo the mistake by increasing her saving rate, changing her portfolio, or going back to work.
Workers who elect or are required to set aside part of their wages in a private retirement Many proposals to privatize social security rest on the theory that workers will make informed and sensible choices if offered complete freedom to choose their retirement age, saving rate, and investment strategy. Under this assumption, popular with professors of economics and finance, workers select their retirement age and lifetime saving plan based on a farsighted evaluation of the potential risks and rewards of different retirement and saving options. This assumption is probably valid for some workers but is unlikely to be true for most of them. Many observers, including a few economists, are skeptical that workers think about retirement and savings in the farsighted and logical way just described. One reason that governments require workers to participate in social security, that companies provide pensions to their employees, and that unions pressure employers for more generous pensions is lack of confidence that workers will make sensible provision for old age on their own. The basic rationale for compulsory employer and government pensions is that it is better to organize retirement saving collectively and paternalistically rather than to rely on the unaided efforts of individual workers.
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IV. Policy implications
A traditional defined-benefit pension helps solve a number of problems that most workers face as they prepare for retirement. First, the plan automatically sets aside a portion of current compensation as savings for retirement. Money in the account only becomes available when the worker is old or retired. Workers do not have to rely on their own judgment to select a retirement saving rate, nor do they have to rely on self-discipline to stick with the saving plan they adopt.
Second, the money set aside in the retirement plan is managed by specialists who are knowledgeable about investing. Workers are not asked to rely on their own investment expertise, which may be limited. At least part of the investment risk is borne by employers or the government, reducing the variability of pensions that workers can expect to receive. Third, when workers reach the end of their careers, their retirement nest eggs are converted into monthly annuity payments that last for the remainder of their lives. Workers do not need to worry about living too long or spending their nest egg so quickly that they exhaust their retirement savings before they die.
A mandatory private DC pension solves one the three problems just mentioned by requiring workers to contribute a fraction of wages to a pension fund. If the mandatory pension also includes a provision requiring workers to convert their pension nest eggs to an annuity upon retirement it may solve a second problem as well. Workers will not have to worry about outliving their retirement savings. Workers are still left with the problem of highly uncertain pensions. They can of course adopt a very conservative investment strategy. Their pensions will be less variable but their expected rate of return on contributions will be much lower than they could have obtained under a collective retirement system, one in which investment risks are broadly shared across workers and taxpayers in several generations.
When workers in a DC plan are offered a variety of investment options in which to invest their savings, well-informed workers can in theory benefit by selecting an investment strategy that is closely aligned to their attitude toward expected return and risk. The question is, how large a percentage of workers is well-informed and disciplined? Optimists believe the percentage is high, and they are therefore more inclined to support a large role for publicly regulated but privately managed and worker-directed DC pension accounts. Pessimists are skeptical whether a large percentage of workers is competent to manage their own retirement -26 -savings. They are more inclined to favor public management or strong public regulation of investment choices and pension fund administration.
Last year's financial market turbulence should have reminded both policymakers and workers of the fact that even conservative investment strategies offer little assurance workers will reach old age with enough assets to pay for a comfortable retirement. To some degree the risks facing workers can be reduced through better financial education and the development of new retirement investment products. Although proponents of individual accounts continue to be confident that workers can purchase safe assets that will yield high rates of return, recent experience suggests that neither the value of financial assets nor their real return is predictable enough to assure a comfortable retirement income. Workers who follow identical investment strategies but who retire a few years apart can receive pensions that are startlingly unequal. By diversifying risks across generations and across different sources of pension funding, a sensibly designed public pension system can sharply reduce some of the risks inherent in a mainly private, capital-funded retirement system.
